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There has been little research into the comparison of historically black colleges 
and universities (HBCUs) to predominantly white institutions (PWIs) in recent 
years. With growing athletic department budgets, it is important to understand 
how HBCUs financially compare to their PWI counterparts. Therefore, the purpose 
of this study was to determine how HBCU athletic departments compare to their 
peer PWIs in terms of athletic department spending and to conduct a budgetary 
analysis of HBCU athletic departments. To examine differences in athletics budgets, 
data were collected from the U.S. Department of Education’s Equity in Athletics 
Disclosure Act (EADA) Survey. NCAA member institution peer groups with HBCU 
members were selected for this study. Institutional data include salary, recruitment, 
operation, and scholarship expenses and revenue for peer groups. An ANOVA was 
conducted to compare peer institutions, institutions in the same region, by division, 
and overall. The results indicated HBCU peer groups are spending significantly less 
compared to their PWI counterparts. Additionally, among HBCU institutions, most 
athletic programs are spending the most on athletic aid expenses. Similarly, HBCUs 
are earning significantly less revenue compared to their peers. Athletic department 
administrators can use the results of this study to help create budgets comparable to 
peer institutions.
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In recent years, a number of historically black colleges and university (HBCU) 
athletic departments have undergone significant changes. For example, in 2015, 
NCAA Division II institution Paine College dropped its football program (Logue, 
2016). A year later, Stillman College moved from an NCAA institution to an NAIA 
institution and cut all but four sport programs. In 2017, Savannah State University 
announced plans to drop from a Division I institution to Division II. When major 
changes like those highlighted above occur at HBCUs, a lack of resources and fis-
cal responsibility are often the reasons given to dissatisfied students, alumni, and 
fans. For example, Paine College’s suspension of its football team was explained 
as a strategy to “firmly establish the financial health of the college” (Davis, 2015, 
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para. 3); similarly, Savannah State’s move to Division II came because “it wasn’t 
financially feasible to continue playing in NCAA Division I” (Heath, 2017, para. 2). 
HBCU administrators cite funding university programs as the top challenges facing 
their universities (Arnett, 2014).
Much of the research on the differences in HBCU athletic departments has oc-
curred in the past 20 years. HBCU athletic contests are more than just athletic events; 
they are overarching social experiences including events such as battle of the bands, 
parades, and college fairs (Cianfrone, Pitts, Zhang, Byrd, & Drane, 2010). As an ex-
ample of the spectacle often associated with HBCU sporting events, many HBCUs 
attribute a large portion of their annual revenues to the “football classics” held yearly 
at neutral sites against rival teams. An example of this profitable endeavor is the old-
est HBCU classic, the Tuskegee Morehouse Classic, featuring Tuskegee University 
and Morehouse College and held annually in Columbus, Georgia. This classic has 
been played every year since 1902, and the success of the classic has generated reve-
nue that helps support the rest of the schools’ athletic department budgets for the year 
(Seymour, 2006). Despite the economic windfall that some of these events provide, 
many HBCU athletic departments have reported budget shortages (Trahan, 2012).
With the limited budgets at HBCU athletic departments, many coaches in these 
departments have reported high levels of stress. Job security and lack of resources 
are cited as two main factors that caused stress for coaches in HBCU athletic de-
partments (Robbins, Gilbert, & Clifton, 2015). Additionally, the financial strain at 
HBCUs can be problematic for athletic administrators when trying to attract the best 
coaches and student-athletes (Cooper & Hawkins, 2002; Robbins et al., 2015). 
As noted by Jones and Bell (2016), research on intercollegiate athletics specif-
ically focused on HBCUs has been “noticeably absent” (p. 49). Furthermore, con-
sumers of HBCU athletic teams are rarely studied (Cianfrone et al., 2010; Stone, 
Cort, & Nkonge, 2012). In light of the challenges currently facing many HBCU ath-
letic administrators, the purpose of this study was to conduct a budgetary analysis of 
HBCU athletic departments. As part of this examination, we endeavored to identify 
major disparities that could constrain HBCU programs from maintaining competi-
tiveness with other athletic programs at the Division I level. Below, we highlight the 
existing literature on HBCU funding and athletic administration. 
Literature Review
History of HBCUs
The Higher Education Act of 1965 defined HBCUs as “institutions of higher learning 
established before 1964, whose principal mission is the education of Black Amer-
icans” (Albritton, 2012, p. 311). Originally, HBCUs opened their doors with the 
mission to “provide access to higher education for African Americans, who were 
previously enslaved and later segregated in the United States” (Clement & Lidsky, 
2011, p. 150). In the southern US, many HBCUs became prevalent with the aid of 
northern U.S. religious institutions following the Morrill Act of 1862 (and second 
Morrill Act of 1890), which required states to either admit black students to pre-ex-
Elliott and Kellison          27
isting state funded institutions (i.e., land grant funded) or finance schools for black 
students to enroll (Bracey, 2017). With the racial tensions in the south at the time of 
this legislation, many states decided to open separate institutions for black students, 
initiating the financial disparities between HBCUs and their peer PWIs. With this 
newly passed legislation, Alcorn State University opened in 1871, becoming the first 
HBCU to use the legislation. However, an unintended consequence of the legislation 
resulted from the government still having control over the allocation of funds to both 
the original institution and the supposed “separate but equal” HBCU established to 
satisfy the Morrill Act. This meant states were still able to control how funds were 
allocated to the PWIs and HBCUs. 
As black men gained access to institutions of higher education, they fought to 
earn seats of leadership and decision making within their institutions (Albritton, 
2012). As these institutions gained financial footing, HBCU alumni and black Amer-
icans wanted to take the roles of teachers, deans, presidents, and trustees. This meant 
that seats originally held by church missionaries (typically from northern religious 
institutions) were asked to step aside so the HBCUs could run themselves. During 
the height of HBCU enrollment (prior to the Brown v. Board of Education decision), 
90% of all black college students attended HBCUs, demonstrating the original pur-
pose of these institutions was being met.
Despite the internal push for successes amongst HBCUs, since the Brown v. 
Board of Education decision, enrollment at HBCUs has continued to decrease as 
more black college students were given the opportunity to enroll in PWIs. This trend 
has resulted in HBCUs receiving fewer tuition dollars. Aiding in the decrease in en-
rollment at HBCUs, the Education Act of 1965 required PWIs to increase minority 
enrollment, resulting in additional competition for HBCUs to maintain enrollment.
Current Financial State of HBCUs 
HBCU are facing painful financial struggles as enrollment continues to decrease 
and fears of dwindling support from the government administration increase (Cam-
era, 2017). Decreasing enrollment proves problematic for these institutions specifi-
cally because they are “heavily dependent on tuition income” (Stewart, 2017, p. 11). 
HBCUs only receive a small percentage of overall grants from the federal govern-
ment and the dollar amount allocated to HBCUs has been decreasing (Arnett, 2014). 
HBCUs continue to find themselves in trouble with accreditation issues that could 
cause the historic and important institutions to shut down permanently. In a 2014 
study, HBCU administrators stated financing university programs as their top chal-
lenge (Arnett, 2014). Financial volatility may be especially problematic for HBCUs 
because they have traditionally been a home for many first generation and low-in-
come students (Camera, 2017). Many of these students rely on tuition assistance 
like Pell grants and direct loans, but these forms of financial aid are becoming less 
common at HBCUs (Arnett, 2014). The need for HBCUs in the country is validated 
by the increasing number of testimonies from HBCU graduates claiming they would 
not be where they are today if not for their four years at an HBCU (Camera, 2017). 
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These testimonies affirm the need for HBCUs, but their financial state does not look 
promising. 
One strategy many HBCUs have implemented in response to these budgeting 
issues is to increase their focus on fundraising and alumni relations. Despite this ef-
fort, the last major gift to an HBCU was in the 1980s, indicating that potential donors 
are not making the investment in HBCUs (Stuart, 2017). With the limited external 
funding to HBCUs, it has been suggested that they earmark funds for academics and 
remove funding for athletic programs (Savage, 2017). This will ensure survival of 
the institution but could also take away from the student experience in college. Sug-
gestions also call for a reevaluation of the academic programs offered on campus at 
HBCUs. The consolidation of academic programs should ensure only the programs 
that prepare students for work after graduation are offered (Savage, 2017). 
A recent example of an HBCU that was forced to close its doors is Morris Brown 
College. The historic HBCU was established in Atlanta in 1881. However, as the col-
lege sought to grow its public profile through promotional campaigns, replacement 
funds were not raised and the institution was forced to make cuts, eventually leading 
to the school’s loss of accreditation in the early 2000s (Wheatley, 2017). Losing 
accreditation proved fatal as institutions with no accreditation are not able to award 
federal financial aid. As mentioned previously, many students with interest in attend-
ing HBCUs rely on this type of funding as they come from low income families. The 
unfortunate example of Morris Brown College seems to foreshadow the possibilities 
for other HBCUs as enrollment is dropping and the tuition dollars are not coming 
into the institutions. Today, many of the buildings have fallen into disrepair, includ-
ing Alonzo Herndon Stadium, the college’s football stadium and a competition ven-
ue for the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games. With the example from Morris Brown 
College, a college that invested heavily on athletic programs and facilities, comes 
the need to reevaluate where HBCUs are allocating money and if the allocation to 
athletics can hurt the institution. 
Financing HBCU Athletic Programs
Over the past 10 years, expenditures have increased significantly among HBCUs, 
however there has been little research on exactly how expenditures in HBCU athlet-
ics have increased. (Jones & Bell, 2016). Specifically, Jones and Bell (2016) called 
for more research on specific reasons HBCUs are spending more on athletics in areas 
such as coach salaries, scholarships, athletic aid, and operating expenses. Further 
understanding of those expenses could help HBCU athletic administrators better un-
derstand how to allocate funds. With the increased expenses comes the challenge for 
athletic department administration to secure revenue sources. As discussed above, 
signature events like the Tuskegee Morehouse Classic can generate significant reve-
nues used to subsidize a large portion of competing teams’ athletic budgets. Howev-
er, despite the success of some classic games, not all teams competing in neutral-site 
competitions have realized increased revenue. New classics are proving to be less 
profitable, as they cannot draw the attendance of the more well-known classics (Sey-
mour, 2006). 
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An additional factor causing the downfall of these neutral-site classics is the 
increasing popularity of guarantee games against top Division I programs, in which 
institutions are choosing to play instead of HBCU classics because they receive a 
large payout (Greenlee, 2012). For example, in 2013, Florida A&M University was 
paid $900,000 (more than one-half of its annual football budget) to play Ohio State 
in football; they lost the game, 76–0 (Hruby, 2017). Despite the physical risks of 
playing these guarantee games, exposure for student-athletes, the ability for coaches 
to get a better understanding of their team’s performance, and the revenue generated 
from these games can outweigh these risks (Nocera, 2016).
Despite the popularity of the classics and the guarantee games HBCU programs 
play in annually, it is widely reported that HBCUs struggle in athletic department 
funding (Nocera, 2016). For example, after announcing her university’s move from 
Division I to Division II, Savannah State President Cheryl Dozier cited the decision 
will help maintain fiscal responsibility for the students and institution (Suggs, 2017). 
Originally a Division II NCAA institution, Savannah State University was not able to 
capitalize on football revenue in Division I as they failed to field a competitive pro-
gram. Their history as a Division I institution left a dismal overall football program 
record of 22-140 (Suggs, 2017). This is not surprising as Savannah State University 
allocated the least funds to football expenses when compared to all other institutions 
in their Division I conference (EADA, 2017). Move over, they spent the second 
lowest amount in total expenses at their previous Division I conference. Their lack 
of funding prevented success and pushed them back to Division II where they can be 
move competitive financially.
One way to drive additional revenue is through a dedicated marketing strate-
gy. However, as reported by Li and Burden (2009), the majority of HBCUs do not 
employ a marketing or external relations employee in their athletic department. Al-
though research has shown employing a marketing or external relations employee in 
athletics is crucial to securing sponsorships, most HBCUs do not have a designated 
employee for this task (Li & Burden, 2009). A lack of funding is preventing many of 
these institutions from hiring the needed personnel. Similarly, Jackson, Lyons, and 
Gooden (2001) found that most HBCU athletic departments are not putting effort 
into developing a marketing department or employees to put themselves in a better 
position to solicit corporate sponsors. Although past studies have focused on the lack 
of financial resources at HBCUs, it remains unclear how HBCUs specifically com-
pare financially to their peer institutions and the extent, if any, to which a financial 
deficit exists. 
Attracting Coaches and Student-Athletes to HBCUs
Minority head coaches at all levels of collegiate football are reportedly underrepre-
sented (Bozeman & Fay, 2013), despite a reported positive increase in Black colle-
giate football coaches (Bopp & Sagas, 2012). Consequently, it is important to look at 
HBCU football programs and understand some stressors for these coaches and why 
they are not moving on to higher sought after collegiate football coaching positions. 
One reason reported by Auerbach (2016) is that the overall record of many HBCU 
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coaches may suffer from participating in guarantee games that, while important for 
the program’s financial picture, nearly always results in lopsided losses. In other 
words, after piling up losses as the coach of a small-budget Division I and II football 
programs competing against Division I FBS programs, these coaches might be over-
looked by hiring committees focused on overall records.
At the student-athlete level, Cooper and Hawkins (2002) interviewed male, 
Black student-athletes at HBCUs and found most of the student-athletes’ primary 
college choices were predominantly white institutions (PWIs). The authors hypoth-
esized that the higher visibility of and resources available at PWIs contributed to 
student preference. During their interviews, the student-athletes admitted they had a 
challenging time balancing academic and athletic responsibility at HBCUs (Cooper 
& Hawkins, 2002). This research is consistent with later work by Robbins, Gilbert, 
and Clifton (2015), who found the lack of funding at HBCUs caused teams to travel 
by bus on long rides, typically across state lines. Furthermore, coaches at HBCUs 
typically have to monitor study hours on these long trips, adding responsibilities to 
their already long list of duties (Robbins et al., 2015). The financial strain at HB-
CUs is noticeable and can be an issue when trying to attract the best coaches and 
student-athletes. 
There has also been a decline in first-generation college students-athletes 
competing at NCAA institutions (Farrey, 2017). With this decrease in the overall 
student-athlete population, the number of first-generation college student-athletes 
at HBCUs is growing. This reality is based on coaches having to recruit certain 
student-athletes based on the prediction of the student-athlete having the ability to 
balance athletics with coursework, ensuing a good academic performance (Farrey, 
2017). With the added stress for coaches to not only recruit great athletes but also 
students that can perform well in the classroom, comes the need for institutions to 
make their athletic programs desirable for incoming student-athletes. Given that 
HBCUs are enrolling first-generation college students at an increasing rate, there is 
growing demand for academic support services that can aid in maximizing students’ 
chances for success. 
Divisional Analysis 
The number of participants attending an event has surfaced as a factor leading to 
sponsorship success (Berrett & Slack, 2001). As noted previously, many HBCU 
athletic contests are highly attended; for example, the SIAC has led Division II in 
football attendance for 13 consecutive seasons (Reddick, 2017). Thus, with the num-
ber of fans attending HBCU athletic contests, they become an ideal candidate for 
corporate sponsorship. Even with crowds attending these games, athletic adminis-
trators at HBCUs have not capitalized on the value of their fans to increase revenue 
(Armstrong, 2001). 
Despite the highly attended HBCU Division II football games, questions have 
been raised about why Division I HBCU athletic programs remain under the Di-
vision I classification when they are not stacking up financially (Trahan, 2012). 
However, history and pride have been cited as two reasons for HBCU Division I 
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institutions to remain under the Division I classification (Trahan, 2012). It is not 
only the HBCU Division I institutions that find trouble competing against their peer 
institutions, HBCU Division II institutions experience the same financial woes in 
comparison to their peer institutions on their competition schedule. Two examples of 
institutions that had to recently make cuts are Paine College and Stillman College, 
both of which originally played football in the Division II athletic conference, the 
Southern Intercollegiate Athletic Conference. Stillman College not only cut football, 
but also cut every other sport program in their athletic program except for men’s and 
women’s basketball. Although the cuts seem dramatic, the president of Stillman Col-
lege claimed athletics were still important to the institution historically, and men’s 
and women’s basketball were kept at the institution in the hopes of rebuilding the 
athletic department in the future (Logue, 2016).  
Recently, on the Division I landscape, Howard University made the decision to 
leave the Middle Eastern Athletic Conference (MEAC) to join the Big South Confer-
ence. The MEAC is one of two HBCU conferences made up of mostly HBCUs. One 
of the reasons stated by Howard University in their decision to switch conferences 
was the travel cost for the institution as well as the travel time for the student-athletes 
at Howard University (Carter, 2017). It is important to note, Howard University was 
a successful member institution of the MEAC, consistently winning football and 
basketball conference championships. This move was cited as a financial decision, 
thus proving the need to analyze financial reporting and expenditures by HBCU 
athletic departments. 
Athletic Scholarships
In Division I and II institutions, institutions are permitted to offer scholarships to 
student-athletes and over the years, athletic aid expenditures by institutions have 
been growing (Wolverton, 2016). Although the scholarships given by institutions 
are growing, only between 1–2 percent of students at colleges and universities re-
ceive athletically related financial aid, totaling one billion dollars a year (Ziff, 2017). 
With the amount of scholarships increasing, this can be an opportunity for the power 
institutions that have the revenue and financial resources to further pull away and 
create a bigger divide from the lower funded institutions. Specifically, in this study, 
the difference between HBCU athletic programs and their peer institutions will be 
analyzed to see if this growth in scholarship spending at institutions is creating the 
divide between HBCUs and PWIs. 
Despite the scholarship potential, not all athletes are benefiting at HBCUs, es-
pecially the female athletes (Theune, 2016). That is, while Title IX legislation has 
increased opportunities to participate at HBCUs, Black female student-athletes are 
receiving fewer scholarships at HBCUs than in previous years. This can be attributed 
to the growth in non-Black student-athletes at HBCUs receiving scholarships. Over-
all, the number of Black student-athletes participating at HBCUs has decreased with 
the increase in white student-athletes (Bell & Jones, 2016). Based on this current 
trend, additional research into the differences in scholarship spending at HBCUs may 
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help identify inefficiencies that can be corrected to prevent the closing of doors for 
Black women student-athletes and work to increase athletic aid opportunity. 
Conflict Theory and HBCUs
Conflict theory is based on the struggle that occurs between groups competing for 
limited resources. When such conflict occurs, cultural values, including economic, 
political, and social interests, are supported by the dominant group (i.e., those with 
the most resources; Sage & Eitzen, 2015). An unfortunate consequence of society 
viewed through this perspective is that the group with limited resources continues 
to fall to the rules set by the “haves” of society. This means some views, especially 
those of the most under-resourced groups, are not heard, thereby creating unequal 
social classes. 
Confirmation of conflict theory in practice can be observed in intercollegiate 
athletics, particularly under the NCAA structure. In the NCAA structure, schools in 
the Power Five, elite conferences continue to generate more revenues, while smaller 
schools like those in Divisions II and III lose resources yearly to the big-name in-
stitutions. Strictly looking at overall NCAA revenue redistributed to each member 
institution, Division II only receives 4.37% of the total revenue pie (“Division II 
Finances,” 2018). Moreover, Division III institutions only receive 3.18% of the total 
revenue generated by the NCAA. This is a staggeringly low percentage, as Division 
III institutions make up the largest membership of the NCAA; in other words, the 
institutions that make up a small portion of the NCAA but have the most resources 
are able to direct the culture of the entire membership. Evidence of these influential 
members’ control can be observed in their lucrative television contracts, media deals, 
and overarching revenue streams, all of which are able to redirect these revenue back 
to themselves. Meanwhile, HBCUs and other limited resource institutions continue 
to struggle financially. With the lack of large revenue sources, internal conflict has 
grown in HBCU athletic departments over their placement in the NCAA structure 
and whether they should try and compete in Division I or move to a different division 
(Trahan, 2012). 
With the conflict that currently exists in the NCAA structure, the membership 
has worked on developing programs and grants to give the underserved members an 
opportunity to grow in the structure. As conflict theorists surmise, eliminating the 
inequality in society can bring about harmony (Sage & Eitzen, 2015). One stride 
taken by the NCAA membership is the current NCAA Presidential Pledge. Under 
this campaign, presidents across all three NCAA divisions are asked to sign a pledge 
“promoting diversity and gender equity in intercollegiate athletics” (ncaa.org, 2018). 
This pledge campaign was created in response to the lack of racial and gender di-
versity in leadership positions in all divisions of the NCAA structure. Although this 
pledge might be seen as a step in the right direction by key leaders in the NCAA 
Presidents Council, the results of the pledge might not have a direct impact on giving 
institutions with limited resources the ability to hire additional staff. This leads to 
the overarching problem of the “haves” in the community of intercollegiate athletics 
creating programs that still ensure they have the control of the membership. 
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Although conflict can be seen as having a negative connotation, not all conflict 
should be viewed with a negative light (Bartos & Wehr, 2002). Conflict can be used 
by organizations to better themselves and make the organization stronger. In the 
case of the NCAA, although conflict is inevitable with the growing membership 
body, it should not necessarily be cause for concern by the power elites to keep their 
prestigious role in the membership, but rather an opportunity to strengthen the entire 
membership body. Moreover, as Bartos and Wehr (2002) contend, there are three 
major categories of contested resources: power, prestige, and wealth. In the NCAA 
structure, all three of these resources play a role in creating a divide between insti-
tutions with the most resources and those with the least. Therefore, until significant 
reforms are made, athletically rich institutions will continue to enjoy good fortune 
and increasing distance from institutions with more limited resources like HBCUs. 
Until an analysis on the perceptions, experiences, and opinions of the under-
served members of the NCAA structure, little progress can be made to help the under 
resourced colleges and universities climb the ranks of the NCAA and to effect change 
at the institutional level. Research into athletic resources at smaller NCAA institu-
tions, especially HBCUs, has been notably absent in recent literature, and further 
study in this area can help identify equitable solutions to the current conflict (Jones 
& Bell, 2016). Conflict will always exist among NCAA members because of the 
competition to gain more money, prestige, and power. However, this conflict does 
not have to be a negative result for the membership. Instead, NCAA administrators 
should look for ways to incorporate the interests of all members of the association 
when making decisions, especially in the allocation of financial resources. 
Research Questions
Given the limited institutional financial resources made available for HBCUs, re-
search in this area can not only provide insight into the understudied finances of 
HBCUs compared to their peer institutions, but it can also provide evidence for the 
need for a strategic plan at HBCUs to compete on an equal playing field. As it stands 
now, HBCUs are largely putting greater emphasis on sales and promotions than on 
marketing research. As stated by Jackson et al. (2001), “Without change, innovation, 
and more effective leadership in athletics, and good business sense, HBCU programs 
will continue to miss out on the substantial revenue generated by intercollegiate ath-
letics” (p. 145). In other words, with limited support for robust marketing initiatives, 
HBCU athletic departments must be strategic and well-informed in order to compete 
for corporate sponsors. This study provides a financial snapshot of where HBCUs 
are in comparison to their peers; such information can be used to evaluate strategies 
designed to drive revenue. 
The purpose of this study was to determine how HBCU athletic departments 
compare and contrast to their peer PWIs in terms of athletic department spending. 
The following research questions were used to guide the study:
RQ1: How do athletic department expenses differ between PWIs and HB-
CUs?
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RQ2: What are the largest sources of athletic department expense at HB-
CUs?
RQ3: What athletic department expenses statistically compare and differ 
between peer groups of PWIs and HBCUs?
RQ4: How do athletic department expenses compare between Division I 
and Division II HBCUs?
RQ5: How do athletic department revenues compare and differ between 
peer groups of PWIs and HBCUs?
As detailed further in the following section, data consisting of information on schol-
arships, salaries, operating expenses, and recruiting expenses are compared between 
HBCU and PWI athletic departments institutions to determine areas of deficit and 
where there might be opportunities for improvement. 
Method
Data were collected and analyzed from the U.S. Department of Education’s Equity in 
Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA) Survey. According to the EADA, all co-education-
al postsecondary institutions that receive Title IV funding and have intercollegiate 
athletics are required to submit athletic data for public access. All NCAA Division 
I FCS institutions, Division I no-football institutions and Division II regions with 
an HBCU member were selected for this study. For Division I, FCS institutions and 
Division I non-football schools were analyzed as there are no HBCUs competing in 
the FBS classification. For Division II institutions, institutions in regions that have 
HBCUs were analyzed. There were no HBCUs competing in the Division III classi-
fication. The researchers analyzed data on salary, recruitment, operation, and schol-
arship expenses for each institution. Data were then compared between HBCUs and 
their respective peer institutions: Division I FCS institutions, Division I no-football 
institutions, and Division II institutions in regions with HBCU membership. 
Descriptive statistics were computed to illustrate sources of parity (and dispar-
ity) in the expenses and revenues between HBCUs and PWIs. An ANOVA analysis 
was conducted to determine if the means of the expenses and revenues for HBCUs 
statistically differed from their peer PWIs. To understand the relationships between 
HBCUs and PWIs, the data collected were compared across several classifications, 
including between peer institutions, between institutions in the same region, and 
between divisions. 
Results
The results from this study indicate athletic departments at HBCUs spend signifi-
cantly less on all expense categories when compared to their PWI counterparts. Ta-
ble 1 provides the means in each expense category of data with indication of the 
statistical significance.
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To answer RQ1, ANOVA analysis was conducted to test if the means of athletic 
aid, recruiting, operating, total expenses, and head coach salaries compared or dif-
fered between HBCUs and PWIs. Beginning with athletic aid, PWIs spent signifi-
cantly more when compared to their HBCU counterparts, F(1, 380) = 7.87, p < .001. 
This suggests HBCU athletic departments are not spending as much athletic schol-
arship funds on student-athletes, potentially preventing them from attracting the best 
student-athletes. Likewise, PWIs spent significantly more on recruiting when com-
pared to their HBCU counterparts, F(1, 380) = 26.20, p < .001. This further suggests 
HBCUs are not investing in the resources to remain competitive with their peers to 
attract the best student-athletes for their athletic programs. Additionally, HBCUs are 
spending significantly less on operating expenses, F(1, 380) = 31.53, p < .001. This 
result indicates HBCUs are not putting as much funds toward travel, facilities, and 
game day expenses, potentially not giving their student-athletes the same experi-
ences as their peer institutions. Head coach compensation at HBCUs is also signifi-
cantly lower compared to their PWI peers, F(1, 380) = 29.61, p < .001. This could 
indicate HBCUs might lose quality coaches to institutions willing to pay more for 
the same position. Overall, HBCUs are spending much less than their PWI peers in 
total expenses, F(1, 380) = 34.63, p < .001. This disparity can lead to a competitive 
disadvantage. 
To answer RQ2, means of all HBCU athletic department expenses were com-
pared between athletic aid, recruiting expenses, operating expenses, and head coach 
salaries. Overall, HBCUs spent the most on athletic aid (M = $2,017,406.85, SD 
= $1,390,492.13), with the least amount of funds being spent on recruiting (M = 
$70,547.62, SD = $81,453.45). Likewise, for Division I FCS institutions, HBCUs 
spent the most money on athletic aid (M = $3,267,285.73, SD = $1,170,468.50) 
and the least on recruiting (M = $130,336.40, SD = $90,282.477). Division I no 
football analysis reported the same results with HBCUs spending the least on re-
cruiting (M = $82,409.50, SD = $76,222.58), and spending the most on athletic aid 
expenses (M = $1,500,418.50, SD = $494,908.99). Division II institutional analysis 
also reported the same results with institutions spending the most on athletic aid (M 
= $1,072,286.89, SD = $598,704.90). 
For RQ3, an ANOVA was conducted in the three comparison groups, Division I 
FCS, Division I no football, and Division II institutions. Comparing only Division I 
FCS institutions, PWIs spent significantly more in athletic aid, recruiting, operating 
expenses, and head coach salaries. Overall, Division I FCS HBCUs spent signifi-
cantly less in total expenses when compared to their PWI counterparts, F(1, 122) 
= 29.51, p < .001. Likewise, comparing only Division II institutions, PWIs spent 
more in each expense category leaving HBCUs at a financial disadvantage in overall 
athletic expenses, F(1, 92) = 5.63, p < .05. The only category with no statistically 
different spending in all expense categories was the group of Division I no football 
institutions. Comparing Division I no football institutions, PWIs spent statistically 
more on total expenses, F(1, 92) = 5.63, p < .05, however, all individual expense 
categories showed no difference. 
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RQ4 was analyzed by comparing expenses in each of the five expenses cate-
gories, athletic aid, recruiting, operation, total expenses, and head coach salaries 
between all Division I HBCUs and all Division II HBCUs. In all expense categories, 
Division I HBCUs spent significantly more in total expenses compared to Division II 
HBCUs, F(1, 50) = 97.35, p < .001. This indicates there is still a divide in expenses 
for HBCUs classified in Division I and Division II, and there is rational for HBCU 
institutions to classify in each division. For HBCUs in both Division I and Division 
II, the majority of expenses were in athletic aid (Division I M = $3,120,046.79; Di-
vision II M = $1,072,286.89). Additionally, both Division I (M = $126,342.54, SD = 
$88,757.23) and Division II (M = $22,723.39, SD = $26,121.70) HBCUs spent the 
least on recruiting expenses. 
For RQ5, an ANOVA was conducted in the three comparison groups, Division 
I FCS, Division I no football, and Division II institutions. Overall, PWIs generated 
significantly more revenue compared to their peer HBCUs. Division I FCS HBCUs 
earned significantly less in revenue compared to their PWI counterparts, F(1, 122) 
= 35.90, p < .001. Likewise, comparing only Division II institutions, PWIs earned 
more revenue compared to HBCUs, F(1, 162) = 38.87, p < .001. Comparing Division 
I no football institutions, PWIs earned significantly more revenue as well, F(1, 92) 
= 6.07, p < .05. This indicates in all peer groups, HBCUs are earning significantly 
less revenue compared to their peer institutions, consequently putting them on path 
to limited resources and a financial disadvantage. Although the results of this study 
indicate HBCU peer groups are earning significantly less compared to their peers, 
it is important to note that in the majority of cases analyzed, institutions had similar 
revenues and expenses. In other words, most institutions are not reporting a major 
loss financially on athletic programs. With this result, additional research is need-
ed to analyze revenue streams to understand from where institutions are generating 
money to fund their athletic programs. For example, the EADA data includes direct 
institutional support as revenue for the athletic department. Further analysis can con-
sider if the revenue reported by athletics comes from athletics-related operations, or 
if it originates elsewhere. 
Discussion
With the empirical data collected in this survey, athletic administrators at HBCUs 
can use the information to better understand the expenses at peer institutions and 
structure themselves financially for success. Specially, athletic administrators at HB-
CUs should understand peer institutions are spending most in athletic aid and least 
in recruiting. In some cases, this strategy may reflect the contrasting goals across 
institutions; in other cases, institutions struggling competitively can try and follow 
this model and allocate their funds for success. The data from this study can help 
HBCU athletic administrators understand how their institutions financially differ 
from peer institutions in terms of recruiting, coaching salaries, scholarships, operat-
ing expenses, and overall expenses. This research found in all peer groups, HBCUs 
are not spending as much in each expense category—athletic aid, recruiting, oper-
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ation expenses, total expenses, and head coach salaries—as their PWI peers. If de-
sired, administrators can use these differences to understand where the biggest gaps 
in funding are to target revenue streams to be more competitive financially. For ex-
ample, as most institutions in this study spent the most funds on athletic aid, HBCU 
athletic administrators should target revenue streams that will specifically benefit 
growth in athletic aid expenses. This can mean creating publications and increasing 
donor relationships for a better understanding about how HBCUs are lacking in that 
area and how support can help.
The results of this study indicate HBCU institutions are structured as the “have 
nots” of the NCAA membership. As conflict theory suggests, HBCUs will stay stag-
nant in their place in the NCAA structure unless more discussion and research are 
put into place to help these institutions. At some administrative levels, strategies for 
reform have already been put into place, including the Minority Opportunities Ath-
letic Association, established under the National Association of Collegiate Directors 
of Athletics umbrella and designed to help advance the careers of minority appli-
cants. Through constructive and positive discussions, these programs can be used 
to make decisions that are more inclusive and representative of the entire NCAA 
membership. This consequently will help HBCUs communicate the needs of their 
institutions. 
There are HBCU institutions in Division I and Division II groups of the NCAA 
membership structure, and in both groups, HBCUs fall behind their peers in avail-
able financial resources. This inequity inevitably leads to conflict, especially at the 
Division I level, where institutions receive significant financial benefits from secur-
ing a bid to the annual basketball tournament. If Division I HBCUs do not have the 
funds to compete with fully funded Division I programs, their ability to make the 
tournament becomes bleak and the institutions do not realize the revenue the NCAA 
earns from the television contracts and sponsorships associated with the tournament. 
This cycle furthers ability of the rich institutions to get richer, leaving the under re-
sourced institutions stuck in “their place” in the NCAA structure.
Additionally, the gap in overall expenses might call for HBCUs to reevaluate 
their position in the NCAA structure. As the results of this study indicate, HBCUs 
are not on level financial footing with their peer institutions, but there may be oth-
er options to consider. One such example is the so-called HBCU College Basket-
ball League, a proposed league whose athletes—all full-time students—would earn 
$50,000–$100,000 per year and “be allowed to endorse products, sell autographs, 
sign with agents, accept gifts from boosters, declare for the NBA draft, and event 
be drafted by NBA teams without losing their eligibility” (Hruby, 2017, para. 8). In 
addition to providing competition with the NCAA, the league would “boost the flag-
ging fortunes of the nation’s [HBCUs]” (para. 1). While a proposal like the HBCU 
League is unlikely to be adopted in the immediate future, HBCUs may be led to 
realign by moving to divisions and leagues that are more economically equitable. 
Some have questioned if Division I HBCUs, struggling to maintain equal financial 
footing, should continue to compete against other Division I PWIs (Trahan, 2012). 
The results of this study indicate HBCU athletic departments are spending signifi-
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cantly less on all areas of athletic department expenses. Athletic department admin-
istrators should understand these gaps and determine if they are competing in a divi-
sion that is best for their institution financially and competitively. 
One interesting note in this study is the lack of HBCU representation in NCAA 
Division III membership. In the Division III structure, there are no athletic aid ex-
penses, as student-athletes are not eligible to receive athletic grants-in-aid. The re-
sults of this study indicate HBCUs are spending the most dollars on grant-in-aid 
expenses when compared to recruiting, operations, or coaching salaries. Further re-
search should look to understand why HBCUs continue to compete at the Division 
II level, where they are expected to give student-athletes scholarships. Those funds 
could be spent in other areas that could produce more competitive teams. 
Limitations and Future Research
The data used in this study did not include specific spending in each of the expense 
categories (i.e., athletic aid, recruiting, coaching salaries, scholarships, operating ex-
penses). Therefore, it remains unclear the specific areas in which institutions are 
spending. For example, institutions allocate the majority of funds to revenue gen-
erating sports, basketball and football. Specifically, coaching salaries and operating 
expenses could be higher in the revenue generating sports compared to Olympic 
sports. Further studies can analyze if competitive funding in the areas of athletic aid, 
recruiting, coaching salaries, scholarships, operating expenses, and overall expenses 
really do produce successful athletic teams among peer institutions. This can further 
help HBCU athletic administrators budget for competitive programs while poten-
tially helping their respective institutions cut wasteful spending that might not be 
proving successful at other institutions. 
Two additional factors not addressed in this study were travel distance and ex-
penses. As noted in the literature review, coaches and student-athletes competing at 
HBCUs noted travel as a demand on their experience. Further research can compare 
travel distances and expenses of HBCUs and peer institutions to see if HBCUs are 
at a disadvantage in their current peer groups. Research in this area can further help 
decision makers at HBCUs evaluate their current athletic division and determine if 
they are in the best position for their institution. 
A more in-depth evaluation of revenue streams in HBCU athletic departments 
can also help determine if HBCUs are generating income comparable to their peer 
institutions. This study examined only total revenue earned; however, without un-
derstanding how individual revenue streams differ between HBCUs and their peer 
groups, it is not possible to receive a complete financial picture. As noted in the liter-
ature review, it is suggested that HBCUs continue to increase fundraising and alumni 
relations (Stuart, 2017). HBCU athletic programs have a rich history and there is 
potential for revenue streams from both alumni and the community. However, it is 
critical that further research evaluate how much HBCUs are raking in to offset costs 
when compared to their peer institutions. 
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Overall, it is clear that HBCUs are at a financial disadvantage when compared to 
their peer institutions. Further research to evaluate the entire financial picture rather 
than simply expenses is needed to ensure administers have all of the information 
necessary to make decisions regarding their athletic programs. As mentioned in the 
literature review, there have been recommendations for HBCUs to cut funding to 
athletic programs to ensure financial stability for the institution’s purpose, academics 
(Savage, 2017). With the recommendation to cut funding and the findings in this re-
search, HBCU athletic administrators need to decide how to maneuver their athletic 
programs in the best way for their respective institutions. 
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